Transaction

d6da9e2afbcc7ef9166e16ad9f76ebfdf1e85f35b40869a992ade5e46e90a5ed
Timestamp (utc)
2024-03-22 09:44:55
Fee Paid
0.00000017 BSV
(
0.00895978 BSV
-
0.00895961 BSV
)
Fee Rate
10.38 sat/KB
Version
1
Confirmations
94,386
Size Stats
1,637 B

2 Outputs

Total Output:
0.00895961 BSV
  • j"1LAnZuoQdcKCkpDBKQMCgziGMoPC4VQUckMh<div class="post">After further research...&nbsp; I think the Transmission approach, combined with the existing "only allow connections from 127.0.0.1" is a good short/medium-term solution.<br/><br/>Putting the username:password in a settings.json file in the Bitcoin directory aught to work nicely (since Bitcoin can already parse JSON).&nbsp; And keeping the authentication stuff off the command line and in the HTTP headers instead of the JSON request params is nice and clean.<br/><br/>Long term, the "right" way to do authenticated, secure JSON-RPC is with client-side certificates and https.&nbsp; &nbsp; But that looks like it would be a lot of work to implement and a <a href="http://it.toolbox.com/blogs/securitymonkey/howto-securing-a-website-with-client-ssl-certificates-11500">big learning curve</a> for users to figure out how to generate client-side certificates and how to get both sides of the JSON-RPC connection using them.&nbsp; &nbsp;And I'm not even certain a full-blown client certificate solution would solve the problem of malicious Javascript making JSON-RPC requests via XMLHttpRequests to localhost; if the user installed the client certificate in the browser (because maybe there was a nifty JSON-RPC-powered web front-end to controlling Bitcoin), would the browser automatically send the client certificate if a malicious website made requests?<br/></div> text/html
    https://whatsonchain.com/tx/d6da9e2afbcc7ef9166e16ad9f76ebfdf1e85f35b40869a992ade5e46e90a5ed