Transaction

68b25b3eedb256c2da0a9a1b4697b5a4bb1a1d36ee2fd7ce339dbcd1decd3d06
Timestamp (utc)
2024-03-24 07:34:55
Fee Paid
0.00000016 BSV
(
0.01649551 BSV
-
0.01649535 BSV
)
Fee Rate
10.14 sat/KB
Version
1
Confirmations
101,232
Size Stats
1,577 B

2 Outputs

Total Output:
0.01649535 BSV
  • j"1LAnZuoQdcKCkpDBKQMCgziGMoPC4VQUckM,<div class="post">Regardless of what the technical options are, I think that an escrow will always need to be, by definition, a trusted entity. I can see the automated workflow being easy enough when things go well:<br/><br/>&nbsp; - Buyer sends btc to escrow, stating the recipient address<br/>&nbsp; - Seller sees btc in escrow, marked to send to his address<br/>&nbsp; - Buyer can release funds to seller<br/>&nbsp; - Escrow will automatically do so after x days<br/>&nbsp; - Both parties can open a complaint<br/><br/>And that's all I would automate. When things go bad, both parties should have a fee to pay to the escrow (that fee may be paid in advance to open account there?) so everyone looses something. Then the escrow will just have to mediate.<br/><br/>Because there's a fee *and* a human intermediary, the chances of successful fraud will probably not be economically interesting in the long run. Someone already trusted would make the ideal person for this, and maybe for a small fee some of us 'common guys' could help assert allegations from either side, if we are local to them.<br/><br/>But the money burning solution, while great at preventing economically viable fraud, does nothing to prevent revenge and actually makes everyone loose if one side is dishonest. I would certainly not endorse that.</div> text/html
    https://whatsonchain.com/tx/68b25b3eedb256c2da0a9a1b4697b5a4bb1a1d36ee2fd7ce339dbcd1decd3d06